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The emergence and promotion of cooperation is one of the main issues in evolutionary game the-
ory, as cooperation is amenable to exploitation by defectors, which take advantage from cooperative
individuals at no cost dooming them to extinction. It has been recently shown that the existence of
purely destructive agents (termed jokers) acting on the common enterprises (public goods games),
can induce stable limit cycles between cooperation, defection and destruction when infinite popu-
lations are considered. These cycles allow for time lapses in which cooperators represent a relevant
fraction of the population, providing a mechanism for the emergence of cooperative states in nature
and human societies. Here we study analytically and through agent-based simulations the dynamics
generated by jokers in finite populations for several selection rules. Cycles appear in all cases stud-
ied thus showing that the joker dynamics generically yields a robust cyclic behavior not restricted
to infinite populations. We have also computed the average time in which the population consists
mostly of just one strategy and compare the results with numerical simulations.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 89.65.-s, 02.50.-r
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is necessary for the appearance of com-
plex structures and higher order selection units from in-
dividual behaviors. In this way, cooperation between uni-
cellular life forms gave rise to multicellular organisms,
cooperative animals form communities and cooperation
between humans gives rise to the complex societies we
live in [1]. Thus, it is very important to understand the
conditions that allow cooperation to thrive and evolve in
nature and society. However, cooperative behaviors are
not stable, as they are easily invaded by selfish individ-
uals, who benefit from the interactions with cooperative
ones but avoid paying the costs attached to cooperation.
The selfish individuals, called defectors, have a higher
fitness —a measure of reproductive success— than co-
operators in any well mixed population, and therefore
will spread under the action of natural selection, leading
to the extinction of the cooperative behavior [2], and to
populations where nobody benefits from altruistic acts
(the “tragedy of the commons” [3]).
In the last decades the study of the Public Goods (PG)
game, a mathematical metaphor of a common enterprise,
in which cooperative individuals invest —pay a cost—
and share the benefits with all the players involved in
the game, has led to the discovery of some mechanisms
that allow cooperation to thrive, as introducing reputa-
tion [4], diversity in number and size of groups [5], link-
ing group size and payoffs [6], or the inclusion of spatial
structure and conditional behaviors [7–9]. Furthermore,
it has been proven that the introduction of some behav-
ioral types in well-mixed population, as punishers [10, 11]
or individuals which do not participate in the PG and in-
stead receive a fixed benefit (the so-called ‘loners’) [12],
may promote cooperation. However, the only behavioral
type found so far that allows for the emergence of sta-
ble cycles in the presence of mutations is the so called
joker strategy [13]. Jokers do not take part of the bene-
fits produced by the PG game and instead they provoke
a damage to the common enterprise, thus affecting every
individual involved in it. Surprisingly, the effect of these
indiscriminate destructive agents on the dynamics is the
induction of robust evolutionary stable limit cycles of co-
operation, defection and destruction. A cyclic dynamics
can also be found when loners are involved. However,
jokers induce cycles that are dynamically different from
those found with loners [12], because the latter are neu-
trally stable (i.e, have no fixed amplitudes) and disappear
in the presence of mutations or structural noise.
The inclusion of destructive agents in the PG game is
motivated by the observation that, in nature and society,
the appearance of a risk, as those created by common
enemies, predators or simply dangerous situations, may
induce cooperation among the victims [14, 15].
In a previous work [13], the stability of the evolution-
ary cycles induced by jokers was proven for infinite pop-
ulations through the analysis of the replicator mutator
equation. Here, we extend the study to finite populations
and analyze the dynamics for different updating methods
[16], i.e., different selection dynamics for the population,
in order to analyze if robust cycles are also found. The
conclusion we reach from this study is that the robust cy-
cles obtained using the replicator-mutator equation are
not just restricted to this particular dynamics but are a
2generic feature of the joker model.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we
explain the PG game and review the dynamics in in-
finite populations. Section III provides the stochastic
equations describing the evolutionary dynamics for finite
populations. In section IV we analyze the joker dynamics
in finite populations using different selection dynamics in
order to check the existence of cycles. Section V is de-
voted to conclusions.
II. EVOLUTIONARY CYCLES INDUCED BY
JOKERS IN PUBLIC GOOD GAMES
In each PG game a number n of individuals is randomly
chosen from the entire population. Each cooperative in-
dividual contributes to the common enterprise at a cost c
to itself, which yields a benefit b = rc (r > 1) equally dis-
tributed between all players; defectors free-ride the public
good at no cost, thus obtaining a higher benefit than co-
operators; jokers do not participate on the benefits, and
each one provokes a damage −d < 0 to be shared by all
individuals engaged in the PG game. Note that the cost
paid by C players can be set to c = 1 without loss of
generality: all other payoffs are given in units of c.
Let us call 0 ≤ m ≤ n the number of cooperative
participants, 0 ≤ j ≤ n the number of jokers, n−m−j ≥
0 the number of defectors and S = n− j the number of
non-jokers, i.e., the number of individuals involved in the
PG game, and that potentially benefit from the PG. Then
the payoff of a defector will be ΠD(m, j) = (rm− dj)/S,
and that of a cooperator ΠC = ΠD − 1; as previously
stated, in each interacting group defectors will always do
better than cooperators. Jokers’ payoff is always 0.
In summary, we have
ΠD(m, j) =
rm− dj
S
, 0 ≤ m ≤ S − 1 ≤ n− 1,
ΠC(m, j) =
rm− dj
S
− 1, 1 ≤ m ≤ S ≤ n, (1)
ΠJ(m, j) = 0, 0 ≤ S ≤ n− 1.
A simple invasion analysis [13] shows that the PG thus
defined determines a tragedy of the commons [3] for r <
rmax = n(M − 1)/(M − n), where M is the population
size. For infinite populations, the latter condition reduces
to r < n, as usual in PG games. Therefore, a mixed
population of cooperators and defectors with r < rmax
will end up composed of defectors only. The interesting
question is then if jokers may prevent the extinction of
cooperators and under which conditions. In Ref. [13], it
was shown that, in the region of interest, namely 1 < r <
rmax, d > 0, the system exhibits: (a) joker-cooperator
bistability for 1+d/(M −1) < r < 1+(n−1)d, (b) joker
dominance for r < 1+d/(M − 1) and, most importantly,
(c) a rock-paper-scissor (RPS) cyclic dominance of the
three strategies for
r > 1 + (n− 1)d. (2)
This condition expresses the fact that a single coopera-
tor gets a positive payoff in spite of the damage inflicted
by n − 1 jokers, which allows cooperators to thrive in
the damaging environment that represents a population
of jokers and re-establish a cooperative environment. In
Ref. [13], we analyzed just one dynamics, namely the
replicator-mutation dynamics, and showed that it pro-
duces stable (robust) limit cycles C→D→J→C when mu-
tations are rare, and stable coexistence for high mutation
rates (Fig. 1). In the following we will analyze the dy-
namics of PG with jokers in finite populations under dif-
ferent update rules, check the appearance of cycles and
calculate the average time spent in each homogeneous
state, in order to decide which dynamics better promotes
the survival of cooperation.
III. STOCHASTIC DYNAMICS IN FINITE
POPULATIONS
The deterministic evolution represented by the
replicator-mutator equation is an idealization of the sys-
tem behavior in the limit of infinite populations. To get
a deeper insight into the model we need to address the
question what happens when populations have a finite
size M . To begin with we need to describe the micro-
scopic dynamics in more detail. Hauert et al. [11] have
proposed a protocol in which random selections of n play-
ers are gathered together to play the game. After receiv-
ing their corresponding payoffs the group dissolves and a
new one is sampled. This sampling is made a sufficient
number of times so that on average each player receives
a payoff proportional to the mean payoff she can obtain
given the composition of the population.
Suppose there are m cooperators, j jokers, and M −
m− j defectors in the population. The probability that
the sampling of n individuals contains k cooperators, l
jokers, and n − k − l defectors is given by the extended
hypergeometric distribution
p(k, l|n,m, j,M) =
(
m
k
)(
j
l
)(
M −m− j
n− k − l
)
(
M
n
) . (3)
The average payoff of strategy X within this population,
PX(m, j), is obtained by averaging formulae (1) with this
probability distribution. This is done in Appendix A,
where explicit expressions for PC(m, j) and PD(m, j) are
obtained —obviously PJ(m, j) = 0 irrespective of the
population composition.
Once payoffs are obtained evolution proceeds by im-
itation. Different payoff-dependent updating rules have
been proposed in the literature [16]. All of them de-
scribe a process of birth and death which is defined by
the transition probability T (m′, j′|m, j) from a popula-
tion with composition (m, j) to another one with compo-
3FIG. 1: (Color online.) Cycles induced by jokers in infinite populations. The simplexes describe the replicator-mutator
dynamics for a population of cooperators, defectors and jokers with parameter values satisfying n > r > 1+ d(n− 1), for which
a rock-paper-scissor dynamics is expected. For small mutation rates, the only equilibrium is a repeller (white dot in (a),(b)),
and trajectories end up in a stable limit cycle of decreasing amplitude with increasing µ (black line); when mutations reach a
critical value µc, the system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation and a stable mixed equilibrium appears (black dot in (c)). Thus the
presence of jokers induces periodic bursts of cooperation for low mutation rates, and stable coexistence for high µ. Parameters:
n = 5, r = 3, d = 0.4, µ is (a) 0.001, (b) 0.005, (c) 0.05. (Images generated using a modified version of the Dynamo Package
[17]).
sition (m′, j′) within the set
Nm,j = {(m, j), (m± 1, j), (m, j ± 1),
(m+ 1, j − 1), (m− 1, j + 1)}.
(4)
If now Π(m, j; t) denotes the probability that the popu-
lation has a composition given by (m, j) at time t, then
this probability evolves according to
Π(m, j; t+ 1) =
∑
(m′,j′)∈Nm,j
T (m, j|m′, j′)Π(m′, j′; t).
(5)
It is implicitly asumed that Π(m, j; t) = 0 for all t if the
pair (m, j) is outside the set P ≡ {(m, j) ∈ Z2 : m, j ≥ 0,
m+ j ≤M}.
If we introduce matrix T, with elements T (m, j;m′, j′)
[(m, j) is the “row index” and (m′, j′) the “column in-
dex”] defined as
T (m, j;m′, j′) =
{
T (m, j|m′, j′) if (m′, j′) ∈ Nm,j ,
0 otherwise,
(6)
and vectors Π(t), with elements Π(m, j; t) [where
(m, j), (m′, j′) ∈ P ], then Eq. (5) can be cast in matrix
notation simply as
Π(t+ 1) = TΠ(t). (7)
A. Stationary state
If the process undergoes mutations then matrix T is
ergodic and Eq. (7) has got a unique stationary state, pi,
which is obtained by solving the linear system
pi = Tpi. (8)
In the absence of mutations, though, there are three ab-
sorbing states corresponding to the three homogeneous
populations. A homogeneous population remains invari-
ant because the imitation process cannot change its com-
position. We will denote these vectors eC, eD, eJ, the
index denoting the strategy of the homogeneous popula-
tion. Clearly eC(m, j) = δm,Mδj,0, eD(m, j) = δm,0δj,0,
eJ(m, j) = δm,0δj,M .
B. Infinitely small mutation rate
After every imitation attempt (whether successful or
not), individuals can randomly mutate their strategy.
With probability 2µ the actor of the imitation event
changes its current strategy into one of the other two
equally likely. Parameter µ is referred to as the mutation
ratio. In this section we will be concerned with mutation
rates µ≪ 1.
In the the limit µ→ 0+ the stationary probability dis-
tribution must be a linear combination of the stationary
vectors of the process without mutations, so in principle,
taking the limit
lim
µ→0+
pi =
∑
X=C,D,J
αX eX (9)
should provide the coefficients αX of this linear combi-
nation, but this limit cannot be obtained directly from
Eq. (8). There is an alternative though. It has been
4proven [18] that the µ → 0+ limit of this process is
equivalent to another process with three states, C, D,
J, in which the transition probability between X and Y
is equal to the probability that a single mutant of type Y
invades an otherwise homogeneous population of X indi-
viduals, thus transforming it into a homogeneous popu-
lation of Y individuals. Intuitively, this is tantamount to
saying that mutations are so rare that the ultimate fate
of a mutant is decided before the next mutation occurs.
The stationary vector in this space,
α = (αC, αD, αJ), (10)
provides the values of the coefficients αX in (9).
Following [11], let ρYX denote the probability that a
single Y mutant takes over the population made of the
mutant and M − 1 individuals of type X. Then the tran-
sition probability of going from state X to a different
state Y in the three-states Markov chain defined above
will be rYX = ρYXµ. Introducing R = (rYX) so that the
elements in each column add up to one (this fixes the
diagonal of the matrix), we can rewrite this matrix as
R = I+ µQ, where
Q =

−ρDC − ρJC ρCD ρCJρDC −ρCD − ρJD ρDJ
ρJC ρJD −ρCJ − ρDJ

 . (11)
Vector α is then the solution of the linear system Qα =
0. A little bit of algebra leads to the result
αC = (ρCDρCJ + ρCDρDJ + ρCJρJD)/A, (12)
αD = (ρDCρDJ + ρDCρCJ + ρDJρJC)/A, (13)
αJ = (ρJCρJD + ρJCρCD + ρJDρDC)/A, (14)
with A chosen so as to fulfill∑
X=C,D,J
αX = 1. (15)
C. Finite mutation rates
If the mutation rate is not zero the Markov chain is
ergodic and the stationary state can be obtained by solv-
ing numerically Eq. (8). This is accomplished with better
accuracy by splitting
T = T0 +T1, (16)
pi =
∑
X=C,D,J
αX eX + pi1, (17)
with T0 the transition matrix in the absence of
mutations—i.e., with transitions describing only the im-
itation process. Then pi1 is the solution of the linear
system
(I−T)pi1 =
∑
X=C,D,J
αXT1eX. (18)
D. Imitation rules
In order to specify the transition matrix T we need
to describe the imitation process. Of the many differ-
ent rules applied in the literature [16] we have chosen
the three most commonly employed: unconditional im-
itation, proportional update, and a Moran process. In
all cases the corresponding matrix T is obtained in Ap-
pendix B.
Under unconditional imitation two players are chosen
at random among the population, one as the focal player
and the other one as the model to imitate. The focal
player compares both payoffs and changes her strategy
to that of the model if the latter has a higher payoff.
In this case, the strategy with the highest fitness never
changes except by mutation, which is the only source of
stochasticity in this rule.
Appendix C discusses the value α for this update rule.
There are two possibilities:
(i) r > 1+(n−1)d. In this cases all three homogeneous
states are equally likely [c.f. Eq. (C2)].
(ii) r < 1+(n−1)d. In this cases J is the only absorbing
state of the process [c.f. Eq. (C4)].
Proportional update is entirely similar to uncondi-
tional imitation with the exception that imitation occurs
with probability proportional to the payoff difference be-
tween the model and the focal players. For this reason
the values of α for this rule are the same as those for
unconditional imitation.
In a Moran process a strategy is chosen to be imi-
tated (or reproduced) with a probability proportional to
its population-dependent fitness. The player who imi-
tates (or is replaced by the offspring of) this selected
player is randomly chosen from the rest of the popula-
tion. The only drawback of this rule is that fitnesses
must be positive for it to make sense, so they cannot be
directly the payoffs of the game, because they can take
negative values. A standard mapping between payoff and
fitness is obtained by introducing the selection strength
s [19]. This weights the contribution of the game to the
total fitness of the strategy as F = 1 − s + sP , with P
the average payoff. Bounding the value of s we can force
F to be positive.
The Moran process thus described defines a birth-
death process with two absorbing states, and the cor-
responding probabilities ρXY are obtained via standard
formulae (see Appendix C).
IV. RESULTS: ROBUSTNESS OF THE CYCLES
USING DIFFERENT SELECTION DYNAMICS
In this section we compare the results of agent-based
simulations with those obtained by solving the station-
ary equation (8). Simulations implement the following
stochastic process. We start with a population of M
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FIG. 2: (Color online.) Time evolution of the frequencies of the three strategies in a population of M = 1000 (left) and
M = 100 (right) individuals playing a PG with jokers with different update rules: (a), (b) unconditional imitation, (c), (d)
proportional update, and (e), (f) a Moran process. The presence of jokers induces a cyclic behavior irrespective of the update
rule and the population size, as long as the mutation rate µ > 0. Black solid lines: cooperators, red dashed lines: defectors, and
blue dotted lines: jokers. One period corresponds to one updating event according to the evolutionary rule used. Parameters
n = 5, r = 3, d = 0.4, µ = 0.001; in (a)-(d) s = 1, in (e),(f) s = 0.38.
individuals with equal amounts of C, D and J players.
Then:
1. Assuming that every time step each individual
plays many rounds of the game with different, ran-
domly gathered groups of n players, the payoffs
they obtain will be proportional to the average pay-
offs, as calculated in Appendix A. Thus we assume
that these expressions provide the payoffs each in-
dividual gains every time step.
2. These payoffs are used to update the population
according to the corresponding imitation rule. We
implement the three rules described in Sec. III D.
3. With probability µ each newborn mutates to a dif-
ferent strategy (any of the other two with equal
probability).
A quite general result is that, irrespective of the pop-
ulation size, at low mutation rates simulations show
patterns of cyclic invasions C→D→J→C (see Fig. 2).
These patterns resemble the limit cycles observed in
the replicator dynamics, i.e., for infinite populations [13]
(c.f. Fig. 1).
Roughly speaking we can distinguish three regimes of
mutations. In the low mutation regime the system spends
most of the time in homogeneous states, and the dy-
namics of the system is well described by the µ → 0
limit of the stationary probability distribution pi. This
can be clearly seen in Fig. 3. The dashed-dotted curves
in Figs. 3(a), (c) and (e) represent the fraction of time
spent in transients when a homogeneous population is
replaced by another one arisen as the result of muta-
tions. This fraction is very small for µ . 10−5–10−4,
depending on the imitation rule. For larger mutation
rates (10−5–10−4 . µ . 10−3–10−2) the system spends
as much time in homogeneous populations as in mixed
transient states. This is the regime displayed in Fig. 2,
where cycles are clearly defined even though for some
imitation rules (particularly so for proportional update)
certain homogeneous populations that are hardly ever
reached [Fig. 2(b) shows burst of cooperators which never
reach a fraction higher than 80% of the population]. For
even higher mutation rates homogeneous populations are
very rare and the behavior of the system is very different,
typically dominated by defectors [see Figs.3(b), (d) and
(f)].
Unconditional imitation is practically a deterministic
rule in the low mutations regime. For µ . 10−4 the
population is almost always homogeneous, and is made
of each of the three strategies with equal probability [see
Figs. 2(a), (b) and Figs. 5(a), (b)]. Figure 3(a) shows this
probability as a function of the joker’s inflicted damage
d. As long as d > 0 and r > 1 + (n − 1)d we find each
strategy equally likely. For r < 1 + (n − 1)d a homo-
geneous population of jokers cannot be invaded because
this is the only absorbing state of the Markov chain for
µ = 0. For d = 0 jokers do not inflict damage. Then
the system spends most of the time in a homogeneous
population of defectors. However, random drift allows
for occasional invasions by jokers, who are subsequently
wiped out by cooperators, who in its turn get replaced
again by defectors. Figure 4(b) illustrates a typical real-
ization exhibiting one of these turn-overs.
As of proportional update, its main difference with
unconditional imitation is its being a truly probabilis-
tic rule, in which individuals only imitate higher payoffs
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FIG. 3: (Color online.) Relative times spent in homogeneous as well as in transient states in a population of M = 100
individuals. For practical purposes, a state is considered homogeneous if more than 95% of individuals belong to the same
strategy. Symbols are the result of agent-based simulations; lines are obtained from the solution of Eqs. (17)–(18). Results
for cooperators are represented with (black) squares and solid lines, those for defectors with (red) circles and dashed lines,
and those for jokers with (blue) triangles and dotted lines. Panels (a), (c) and (e) also show (with inverted triangles and
dashed-dotted lines) the fraction of time spent in transient states. Panels (b), (d) and (f) show the fractions of the time spent
in each of the three homogeneous states relative to the total time spent in homogeneous states. Panels (a) and (b) correspond
to unconditional imitation, panels (c) and (d) to proportional update, and panels (e) and (f) to a Moran rule. We can see
that high mutation rates promote defection over the other two strategies. Parameters used are n = 5, r = 3, d = 0.4; selection
strength is s = 1 in (a)–(d) and s = 0.38 in (e) and (f).
with a certain probability. Although in the small muta-
tions regime this leads to the same probability of mutual
invasion of strategies as for unconditional imitation, the
stochastic nature of this rule renders much longer inva-
sion times. This can be clearly appreciated in Fig. 2.
Another effect of stochasticity is that the time spent
in transient states is also longer, thus shrinking the low
mutations regime by more than one order of magnitude
[compare Figs. 3(a) and (c)]. The effect is particularly
notorious for jokers, who take a long time to invade de-
fectors, thus extending the life time of defective popula-
tions. This effect is illustrated in Fig. 5, which represents
a typical realization of an agent-based simulation.
The Moran process is the randomest of the three evo-
lutionary dynamics because even strategies not perform-
ing very well have a chance to get imitated. The effect is
more noticeable the smaller the population. This dynam-
ics imposes an upper limit to the selection strength s (see
Sec. III D) and the probabilities to find the population in
each of the three homogeneous states depend on the pa-
rameters of the game and on s in a nontrivial way (see
Sec. C 2). These probabilities are represented in Fig. 6(a)
as a function of s. The theoretical predictions of Sec. C 2
agree with the simulations. This figure shows that coop-
eration is highly promoted for small s(0.005 < s < 0.05).
In this limit cooperative populations are found with al-
most 50% probability. This probability decreases down
to around 25% for larger s. Figure 6(b) shows a typical
realization of this process, exhibiting a defining feature
of this process, namely the frequent failures of attempted
invasions.
Whichever the update rule, when mutation rates are
not small the system is better characterized by provid-
ing the stationary probability distribution π, as obtained
from Eq. (18)). The results are plotted in Fig. 7 for all
three imitation rules and different mutation rates µ. For
low and intermediate values of µ the higher probabilities
are found near the border of the simplexes, consistent
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FIG. 4: (Color online.) Evolution of a population of M =
100 individuals by unconditional imitation. (a) Fraction of
time spent in homogeneous populations of cooperators (black
squares and solid line), defectors (red circles and dashed line)
and jokers (blue triangles and dotted line), as a function of
joker’s inflicted damage d. Symbols correspond to an agent-
based simulation; lines to the results obtained from numerical
computation of the stationary probability distribution. (b) A
realization made with d = 0 showing an invasion of defectors
by jokers through pure drift, and the subsequent burst of
cooperators and turn-over by defectors. Parameters: n =
5, r = 3, s = 1 and µ = 5× 10−5.
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FIG. 5: (Color online.) Realization of an agent-based sim-
ulation of a population with M = 100 individuals evolving
through proportional update. Notation is as in Fig. 4. Pa-
rameters: n = 5, r = 3, d = 0.4, µ = 5× 10−6, s = 1.
with the cyclic behavior of the system. However, for high
µ the probability peaks around a point. This point is in-
terior for the most stochastic rules, but corresponds to
a defective population for unconditional imitation. The
simplexes are obtained for the same parameter values as
used in Fig. 1, so a direct comparison with the results of
the replicator dynamics can be made.
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FIG. 6: (Color online.) A population of M = 100 individuals
evolving through Moran update. (a) Comparison of the the
relative times in which the population is in a homogeneous
state vs. the selection strength, s, for low mutation rates.
Lines represent the analytical estimates obtained in Sec. C 2;
symbols represent the results from agent-based simulations.
(b) Fractions of each strategy as a function of time as obtained
from a realization of an agent-based simulation. Cooperators
are represented with a black solid line and squares, defectors
with a red dashed line and circles, and jokers with a blue
dotted line and triangles. Parameters are n = 5, r = 3, d = 0.4
and µ = 5× 10−5. In (b) the selection strength is s = 0.05.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have proven that the existence of jok-
ers, i.e., individuals whose purely destructive behavior is
directed against the common enterprises represented by
PG games, allows for the emergence of robust evolution-
ary cycles in finite populations regardless of the updat-
ing method chosen. Together with a previous report [13]
on the existence of limit cycles for infinite populations
evolving via a replicator-mutator dynamics, our present
results show that limit cycles are a generic feature of
the dynamics generated by destructive agents, not re-
stricted to a particular selection dynamics. In fact, this
is a dynamical feature that makes this model different
from other three-player games like that of loners [12], for
which cycles are structurally unstable and their existence
strongly depends on the absence of mutations and other
kinds of perturbations.
In a recent paper [20] Mobilia has shown that, of the
three possible outcomes of the replicator equation for
rock-paper-scissors games [2], namely (a) orbits are at-
tracted towards an asymptotically stable mixed equilib-
rium, (b) orbits cycle around a neutrally stable mixed
equilibrium, and (c) orbits go away from an unstable
mixed equilibrium and approach the heteroclinic orbit
defined by the border of the simplex (the case of the
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FIG. 7: (Color online.) Density plots for the probability of finding the system in each population state as obtained by solving
numerically Eq. (8). First row corresponds to unconditional imitation, second row to proportional imitation, third row to a
Moran process. In each case mutations increase left to right. In all three cases low mutation rates (µ) yield high probabilities
near the boundaries of the simplexes, specially near the corners, corresponding to cyclic transitions between homogeneous states.
Increasing µ increases the probability to find the system near homogeneous defective populations. For high µ an attractive
point appears close to the D corner which goes away from it upon increasing µ. Parameters are n = 5, r = 3, d = 0.4; the
selection strength is s = 1 in the first and second rows, s = 0.38 in the third. Mutation rates have been chosen as in Fig. 1 and
appear near each simplex. Densities are plotted using a logarithmic scale.
9Joker game), adding mutations between the three strate-
gies merges cases (a) and (b), both of which yielding a
mixed equilibrium. Oscillations disappear in these two
cases. The Loners game belongs to class (b). In con-
trast, the Joker case analysed in this paper belongs to
class (c), with mutations generating an attractive, stable
limit cycle. In this case the dynamics oscillates between
the three strategies with well-defined and robust oscil-
lations. We are not aware of any other game for which
the inclusion of a simple behavioral type (jokers do not
need memory, have no especial recognition abilities, and
do not rely on any reputation generated along the game)
leads to cycles which are robust to perturbations and
have a well defined period and amplitude irrespective of
the initial fractions of players.
We have expanded here these results and have proven
that the oscillatory dynamics does not occur only for in-
finite (or very large) populations evolving under a repli-
cator dynamics, but also in the case of finite populations
and for different update rules. We have analyzed un-
conditional imitation, proportional update, and a Moran
process. In all cases the system exhibits finite time lapses
in which most of the population is composed by cooper-
ative individuals, finding that the Moran process for low
(but not extremely low) selection pressures is the most
favorable to cooperation—as the system spends 50% of
the time in cooperative states. Under unconditional im-
itation the system spends one third of the time in co-
operative states, whereas the more stochastic nature of
proportional update favors defection due to the slower
invasion of jokers, and thus the system stays longer in
defective states—especially so for high mutation rates.
Let us note that, if the damage d inflicted by jokers is
zero, jokers are not able to overcome defectors and oscilla-
tions are supressed. The system ends up in a steady pop-
ulation where cooperation becomes extinguished, both
with and without mutations [13]. Indeed, this case is
identical to the loner model when the benefit obtained
by loners is also zero, situation in which both jokers and
loners become simply non-participants in the game with
the only effect of reducing the effective number of players
[12, 13]. We have shown here that for finite populations
and d = 0 random drift allows for bursts in which the
system spends some time in fully cooperative states, but
that the happening probability of such events is very low.
The existence of damaging agents, which are able to
destroy the defective populations and lead to a state
without cooperators and defectors, gives cooperators the
chance to re-build cooperative enterprises, and thus pro-
motes cooperation. This result, as well as modifications
of the model presented here, might be interesting in the
study of human evolution, where examples of destructive
periods can be found along history as a result of revolu-
tions or wars. It has been suggested that these destruc-
tive periods take place whenever a society reaches a point
where the public goods fall below a certain threshold [21].
The Joker game shares this feature. Modifications of the
model presented here may thus help explain not only how
cooperation in animals arises whenever there is a risk or
they face a predator, but also provide insights into the
evolutionary cycles observed in human society.
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Appendix A: Average payoffs in a finite population
Let us denote PX(m, l) the average payoff that a player
of type X receives when the population is made of m co-
operators, j jokers, andM−m−j defectors. This average
payoff is calculated by averaging the corresponding pay-
off (1) with the probability distribution (3). For defectors
this implies
PD(m, j) =
∑
k,l≥0
k+l<n
rk − dl
n− l
p(k, l|n−1,m, j,M−1). (A1)
To perform this average it will prove convenient to fac-
torize the probability distribution as the product of two
standard hypergeometric distributions, i.e.,
p(k, l|n,m, j,M) = p(l|n, j,M)p(k|n−l,m,M−j). (A2)
where
p(l|n, j,M) =
(
j
l
)(
M − j
n− l
)
(
M
n
) . (A3)
The first term in (A2) is the probability of selecting l
jokers out of the population, and the second term is the
conditional probability of subsequently selecting k coop-
erators, given that we have already selected the l jokers.
A useful identity of the hypergeometric distribu-
tion —consequence of the properties of the binomial
coefficients— is
k p(k|n,m,M) =
nm
M
p(k− 1|n− 1,m− 1,M − 1). (A4)
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Substituting factorization (A2) into (A1) and making use
of this identity we readily obtain
PD(m, j) =
rm
M − j − 1
n−1∑
l=0
n− l − 1
n− l
p(l|n− 1, j,M − 1)
− d
n−1∑
l=0
l
n− l
p(l|n− 1, j,M − 1).
(A5)
A new identity, namely
p(l|n− 1, j,M − 1)
n− l
=
M
n(M − j)
p(l|n, j,M), (A6)
allows us to do the sum
n−1∑
l=0
p(l|n− 1, j,M − 1)
n− l
=
M [1− p(n|n, j,M)]
n(M − j)
. (A7)
It will prove convenient to introduce the function
Ξ(n, j,M) ≡
j
M − j
[
1−
(j − 1) · · · (j − n+ 1)
(M − 1) · · · (M − n+ 1)
]
,
(A8)
in terms of which
1− p(n|n, j,M) = 1−
j(j − 1) · · · (j − n+ 1)
M(M − 1) · · · (M − n+ 1)
=
M − j
M
[1 + Ξ(n, j,M)] .
(A9)
This allows us to write
n−1∑
l=0
p(l|n− 1, j,M − 1)
n− l
=
1 + Ξ(n, j,M)
n
, (A10)
and using this in (A5) obtain
PD(m, j) =
rm[n− 1− Ξ(n, j,M)]
n(M − j − 1)
− dΞ(n, j,M).
(A11)
As for the average payoff of a cooperator,
PC(m, j) = −1 +
∑
k,l≥0
k+l<n
r(k + 1)− dl
n− l
× p(k, l|n− 1,m− 1, j,M − 1)
= r
n−1∑
l=0
p(l|n− 1, j,M − 1)
n− l
− 1 + PD(m− 1, j)
=
r
n
[1 + Ξ(n, j,M)]− 1 + PD(m− 1, j).
(A12)
Therefore
PC(m, j) =
r
n
(
1 +
(n− 1)(m− 1)
M − j − 1
)
− 1
+
[
r
n
(
1−
m− 1
M − j − 1
)
− d
]
Ξ(n, j,M).
(A13)
Finally, PJ(n, j) = 0 because jokers get zero regardless
of the composition of the population.
Appendix B: Calculation of the transition matrices
Transition probabilities T (m, j|m′, j′) are obtained ac-
cording to the specified update rule. We will calcu-
late those corresponding to the rules used in this work.
But before we proceed let us introduce some shorthands.
We will write Tǫ1,ǫ2 ≡ T (m, j|m + ǫ1, j + ǫ2), where
ǫ1, ǫ2 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Also by ωXYǫ1,ǫ2 we will denote the prob-
ability that a player of type Y is chosen to be replaced
by a player of type X when the population is made of
m+ ǫ1 cooperators, j+ ǫ2 jokers, andM −m− j− ǫ1− ǫ2
defectors. Whether the Y player is finally replaced by an
X one depends on mutations, thus
T1,0 =ω
DC
1,0 (1− 2µ) +
(
ωJC1,0 + ω
CC
1,0
)
µ,
T1,−1 =ω
JC
1,−1(1− 2µ) +
(
ωDC1,−1 + ω
CC
1,−1
)
µ,
T−1,0 =ω
CD
−1,0(1− 2µ) +
(
ωJD−1,0 + ω
DD
−1,0
)
µ,
T0,−1 =ω
JD
0,−1(1− 2µ) +
(
ωCD0,−1 + ω
DD
0,−1
)
µ,
T−1,1 =ω
CJ
−1,1(1− 2µ) +
(
ωDJ−1,1 + ω
JJ
−1,1
)
µ,
T0,1 =ω
DJ
0,1(1− 2µ) +
(
ωCJ0,1 + ω
JJ
0,1
)
µ,
(B1)
In all cases there are two possibilities for a Y individual
to become an X one, either a pair XY is selected, the
update takes place and no mutation occurs, or another
pair ZY is selected (with Z 6= X) but a mutation changes
Z into X.
Finally, the probability that no change of strategy oc-
curs T0,0 = T (m, j|m, j) is obtained as
T0,0 = 1− (1 − µ)
∑
X 6=Y
ωXY0,0 − 2µ
∑
X
ωXX0,0 , (B2)
where the subscript 0, 0 refers to a population made of
m cooperators, j jokers, and M −m− j defectors.
Notice that the expansion (17) readily follows from ex-
pressions (B1) and (B2).
1. Unconditional imitation
This rule prescribes that two players are selected at
random from the population and the strategy of the
model player (X) replaces that of the focal player (Y)
if the latter has a lower payoff. Accordingly, if X 6= Y,
ωXYǫ1,ǫ2 =
nXǫ1,ǫ2n
Y
ǫ1,ǫ2
M(M − 1)
Θ
(
PXǫ1,ǫ2 − P
Y
ǫ1,ǫ2
)
, (B3)
where Θ(x) = 1 if x > 0 and 0 otherwise, and nXǫ1,ǫ2 de-
notes the number of individuals of type X in the popula-
tion (e.g., nC1,0 = m+1, n
D
1,0 = M−j−m−1, n
J
1,−1 = j−1,
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nD0,0 = M − j −m, etc.). On the other hand, in order to
account for mutations we must define
ωXXǫ1,ǫ2 =
nXǫ1,ǫ2(n
X
ǫ1,ǫ2
− 1)
M(M − 1)
. (B4)
2. Proportional update
Similarly to the previous rule,
ωXYǫ1,ǫ2 =
nXǫ1,ǫ2n
Y
ǫ1,ǫ2
M(M − 1)
Ψ
(
PXǫ1,ǫ2 − P
Y
ǫ1,ǫ2
)
, (B5)
where Ψ(x) = x/Ω if x > 0 and 0 otherwise, Ω being a
constant ensuring that Ψ
(
PXǫ1,ǫ2 − P
Y
ǫ1,ǫ2
)
≤ 1 (typically
Ω is chosen as the largest possible payoff difference). As
in the previous rule ωXXǫ1,ǫ2 is given by (B4).
3. Moran process
In this case payoffs are replaced by fitnesses FXǫ1,ǫ2 =
1− s+ sPXǫ1,ǫ2 (see Sec. III D). Let us introduce the total
fitness of the population
Φǫ1,ǫ2 ≡
∑
X
nXǫ1,ǫ2F
X
ǫ1,ǫ2
. (B6)
The Moran rule specifies that a player is chosen for repro-
duction proportional to its fitness and the offspring re-
places another randomly chosen individual from the rest
of the population. So if X 6= Y,
ωXYǫ1,ǫ2 =
nYǫ1,ǫ2
M − 1
nXǫ1,ǫ2F
X
ǫ1,ǫ2
Φǫ1,ǫ2
, (B7)
and
ωXXǫ1,ǫ2 =
nXǫ1,ǫ2 − 1
M − 1
nXǫ1,ǫ2F
X
ǫ1,ǫ2
Φǫ1,ǫ2
, (B8)
Appendix C: Stationary probabilities in the weak
mutation limit
1. Unconditional imitation and proportional
update
According to the payoffs obtained in Appendix A:
(i) PD(m, 0) > PC(m, 0) for all 0 < m < M , so D
always invades C, but C never invades D.
(ii) PC(m,M−m) > PJ (m,M−m) for all 0 < m < M ,
provided r > 1 + (n − 1)d (the rock-paper-scissors
condition), so under this assumption C always in-
vades J, but J never invades C.
(iii) PJ(0, j) > PD(0, j) for all 0 < j < M , so J always
invades D, but D never invades J.
Therefore
Q =

−1 0 11 −1 0
0 1 −1

 . (C1)
This implies
αC = αD = αJ =
1
3
. (C2)
On the other hand, if r < 1+(n−1)d neither C invades
J nor vice-versa, so in this case
Q =

−1 0 01 −1 0
0 1 0

 , (C3)
which implies
αC = αD = 0, αJ = 1. (C4)
2. Moran Process
The Moran process for a population with two strategies
defines a birth-death process with two absorbing states.
The details of the calculation of ρYX can be found in [11]
and follow standard formulae for this kind of processes
[22]. Summarizing, if we denote PYX(m) the payoff re-
ceived by a type Y individual when the population is
made of m Y individuals and M −m X individuals, then
ρ−1YX =
M−1∑
m=0
qm, ρXY = qM−1ρYX, (C5)
where q0 = 1 and
qm = qm−1
1− s+ sPXY(M −m)
1− s+ sPYX(m)
, 0 < m < M.
(C6)
Payoffs PXY(m) and PYX(m) are obtained from the for-
mulae of Appendix A. The maximum value of the selec-
tion strength s is given by
smax =
1
1− min
XY,m
PXY(m)
. (C7)
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